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A Proposal to Allow the Presentation
of Mitigation in Juvenile Court so that
Juvenile Charges May be Expunged in
Appropriate Cases
Katherine I. Puzone1
“Their own vulnerability and comparative lack of control
over their immediate surroundings mean juveniles have a
greater claim than adults to be forgiven for failing to escape
negative influences in their whole environment.”2
Justice Kennedy writing for the majority in Roper v.
Simmons
Many people believe that juvenile adjudications of
delinquency are automatically expunged upon the youth
reaching the age of majority. In reality, a juvenile adjudication
of delinquency—especially for a felony—can significantly limit a
teenager’s future ability to obtain student loans and
scholarships, join the military, participate in athletics, become a
firefighter or a law enforcement officer or obtain one of many
jobs. As discussed herein, the majority of youth facing charges
in delinquency court are suffering from severe socio-economic
deprivation, are victims of emotional, physical or sexual abuse,
or have serious mental health issues. Many youth caught up in
the delinquency system are impacted by more than one of these
factors, each of which places a teenager at significantly greater
risk of engaging in delinquent behavior. Society tells these
young people to “pull themselves up by their bootstraps,” but at
the same time significantly limits their ability to do just that by
labeling them felons—often violent felons—for the rest of their
1. Associate Professor of Law, Barry University Dwayne O. Andreas
School of Law, J.D., cum laude, New York University School of Law, M. Phil.
University of Cambridge, B.A. Trinity College.
2. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005).
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lives. This article argues that effectively foreclosing a young
person’s future based upon behavior that is linked to
circumstances beyond their control violates the Eighth
Amendment’s proscription on cruel and unusual punishment.
This article proposes an alternative framework that allows
young people to have their juvenile records expunged if they
fulfill certain criteria. This would benefit society as well as the
young defendants, as it would lower the levels of adult
recidivism.
This article proposes to add a new procedure in juvenile
court that would recognize mitigation so that, in appropriate
cases, the child’s juvenile record can be expunged. This would
allow courts to address cases in which the child suffers from a
mental illness that does not rise to the level of an insanity
defense but is mitigating enough that it would violate the Eighth
Amendment for the child to be found guilty of a felony that would
remain on her record for the rest of her life. Similarly, children
living in environments that cause the child to be significantly
more likely to engage in delinquent behavior would be eligible to
have their juvenile records expunged. This article proposes that,
upon a plea or adjudication of delinquency at trial, the court
should hear evidence on relevant mitigation. If the judge finds
that the child’s behavior was significantly impacted by factors
beyond her control including, but not limited to, mental health
issues, child abuse and socio-economic factors, the child will be
able to have her juvenile record expunged upon completing
appropriate treatment and demonstrating improved behavior.
This would refocus a system that has become increasingly
punitive on the purported rehabilitative nature of juvenile court
and allow children from disadvantaged backgrounds to lead
productive adult lives unconstrained by mistakes they made as
teenagers.
Youth prosecuted in juvenile court are not charged with
crimes; rather, they are accused of having committed a
delinquent act.3 While children are not charged with crimes,
they are prosecuted under the same criminal statutes as adults.4
3. In most states, the law provides that delinquent acts are not crimes.
See e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.35(6) (West 2007); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-606
(West 2014); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 380.1 (McKinney 2007).
4. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.0301 (West 2015) (“(1) The circuit court
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Therefore, defenses applicable to adults are the only defenses
available to children. Over time, the juvenile system has become
increasingly punitive and less rehabilitative.5
When a child suffers from a mental illness, raising an
insanity defense is impractical for two distinct reasons. First,
insanity is notoriously difficult to prove, and, in the vast
majority of cases would not provide a successful defense. For
example, Florida follows the well-known M’Naughton test for
insanity.6 Under M’Naughton, an accused is not criminally
has exclusive original jurisdiction of proceedings in which a child is alleged to
have committed: (a) A delinquent act or violation of law.”).
5. While every state has a juvenile court system today, the role of juvenile
court has changed over time. “At the dawn of the twentieth century,
Progressive reformers applied the new theories of social control to the new
ideas about childhood and created a social welfare alternative to criminal
courts to treat criminal and noncriminal misconduct by youth.” Barry C. Feld,
The Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 75 MINN. L. REV. 691, 691 (1991).
After several decades of reform, delinquency courts now closely resemble adult
criminal courts. Id. Feld identifies three types of reform: jurisdictional,
jurisprudential and procedural. Id. at 692. Recent years have seen an
increasing desire of society to criminalize the conduct of children. As penalties
have become more harsh and juvenile sanctions have become more like
criminal sanctions, children do not receive the same protections adult criminal
defendants do. “Although theoretically, juvenile courts' procedural safeguards
closely resemble those of criminal courts, in reality, the justice routinely
afforded juveniles is lower than the minimum insisted upon for adults.” Id.
Feld argues:
The substantive and procedural convergence between
juvenile and criminal courts eliminates virtually all of the
differences in strategies of social control between youths and
adults. As a result, no reason remains to maintain a separate
juvenile court whose only distinction is its persisting
procedural deficiencies. Yet, even with the juvenile court's
transformation from an informal, rehabilitative agency into
a scaled-down criminal court, it continues to operate virtually
unreformed. The juvenile court's continued existence despite
these changes reflects an ambivalence about children and
their control, and provides an opportunity to re-examine
basic assumptions about the nature and competence of young
people.
Id. at 692-93.
6. See Gurganus v. Florida, 451 So. 2d 817, 820 (Fla. 1984).
It is well established in Florida that the test for insanity,
when used as a defense to a criminal charge is the
McNaughton Rule. Under McNaughton the only issues are:
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responsible for his actions if, at the time of the offense, the
defendant, by reason of a mental disease or defect, (1) does not
know of the nature or consequences of his act; or (2) is unable to
distinguish right from wrong. Given the very high bar set by
M’Naughton, a child could be suffering from a serious mental
illness that significantly impacted her behavior and her ability
to form the requisite intent but the diagnosis does not rise to the
level of the insanity defense because the child meets the minimal
standard of understanding right from wrong and understanding
the consequences of her actions.7 As discussed in detail below,
many at-risk children suffer from mental health issues or live in
environments that contribute to negative behavior but neither
of these factors can form the basis for an insanity defense if the
child meets the M’Naughton standard. Second, if a child is
adjudicated not guilty by reason of insanity, the child may be
committed to a civil commitment facility indefinitely.8 Juvenile
court jurisdiction ends at 19, but civil commitment may extend
well beyond that.9 An adjudication of insanity will remain on
the child’s record and could preclude her from obtaining jobs and
professional licenses in the future.10
1) the individual's ability at the time of the incident to
distinguish right from wrong; and 2) his ability to understand
the wrongness of the act committed.
7. For example, in Gurganus, the Florida Supreme Court upheld the trial
court’s exclusion of expert testimony on insanity since the defense experts
could not opine definitively that the defendant (an adult) lacked the ability to
distinguish right from wrong. Id. The Court ruled that the trial court erred,
however, when it excluded evidence that the defendant’s mental state along
with his drug and alcohol consumption, negated his ability to form the specific
intent required for a conviction of first-degree murder. Id.
8. See, e.g., FLA. R. JUV. PROC. 8.095(e) (West 2015). Upon a finding of not
guilty by reason of insanity, the juvenile court must hold a hearing to
determine if the child meets the statutory criteria for involuntary commitment
to a residential psychiatric facility. See FLA. R. JUV. PROC. 8.095(e)(2) (West
2015).
9. If the child meets the criteria for hospitalization and is not released
prior to her 19th birthday, a hearing must take place to determine if the child
requires continued hospitalization. See FLA. R. JUV. PROC. 8.095(e)(2)(G) (West
2015). If continued hospitalization is deemed necessary, proceedings must be
instituted under the adult civil commitment statute. Id. Thus, a child
adjudicated not guilty by reason of insanity could remain committed to a
residential psychiatric program well beyond the termination of jurisdiction of
the juvenile court.
10. See Robert E. Toone, The Incoherence of Defendant Autonomy, 83 N.C.
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Many children in juvenile court suffer from serious mental
illnesses that do not present a defense under the current
system.11 The only alternative to an insanity defense under
current law is to argue that the child was unable to form the
requisite intent due to her mental illness.12 However, most
crimes are general intent crimes and the state must meet a very
low burden to prove intent.13
L. REV. 621, 632-33 (2005).
Mental health defenses are, at least ostensibly, designed to
protect those lacking sufficient mental responsibility from
being undeservedly convicted and punished. Yet the defenses
carry consequences distinct from those accompanying other
affirmative defenses. Defendants acquitted on the basis of
the “insanity defense” are typically committed for an
indefinite period of time to a mental hospital, and may in fact
spend more time institutionalized that they would if
convicted of the offenses charged. Furthermore, society
attaches a stigma to mental health defenses that does not
exist with other affirmative defenses; even after release, an
acquitted defendant is subject to the social and economic
opprobrium commonly associated with mental illness.
11. See Joseph B. Tulman, Disability and Delinquency: How Failures to
Identify, Accommodate, and Serve Youth with Education-Related Disabilities
Leads to Their Disproportionate Representation in the Delinquency System, 3
WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 3, 3 (2003). Tulman cites a statement made
on the floor of the U.S. Senate by Senator Paul Wellstone: “Of the 100,000
children who are arrested and incarcerated each year, as many as 50 percent
suffer from a mental or emotional disturbance.” Id. at 7.
12. See, e.g., Gurganus, 451 So. 2d at 820.
13. See Wayne R. LaFave, Intent and Knowledge, in 1 SUBSTANTIVE CRIM.
L. § 5.2(e) (1986) (footnotes omitted)
[T]he most common usage of ‘specific intent’ is to designate a
special mental element which is required above and beyond
any mental state required with respect to the actus reus of
the crime. Common law larceny, for example, requires the
taking and carrying away of the property of another, and the
defendant's mental state as to this act must be established,
but in addition it must be shown that there was an ‘intent to
steal’ the property. Similarly, common law burglary requires
a breaking and entry into the dwelling of another, but in
addition to the mental state connected with these acts it must
also be established that the defendant acted ‘with intent to
commit a felony therein.’ The same situation prevails with
many statutory crimes: assault ‘with intent to kill’ as to
certain aggravated assaults; confining another ‘for the
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In many juvenile cases, abuse and mental illness are
mitigating in the sense that they provide an explanation for the
conduct rather than a legal excuse.14 “[A] substantial body of
research has long supported the hypothesis that physical
maltreatment, or abuse, leads to delinquency. Victims of abuse
have also been shown to engage in violent offending.”15 For
example, the vast majority of girls in the juvenile justice system
have been victims of abuse, including sexual abuse.16 This very
purpose of ransom or reward’ in kidnapping; making an
untrue statement ‘designedly, with intent to defraud’ in the
crime of false pretenses; etc.
14. See Jennifer Wareham & Denise Paquette Boots, The Link Between
Mental Health Problems and Youth Violence in Adolescence, A Multilevel Test
of DSM-Oriented Problems, 39 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 1003 (2012) (discussing
the link between certain mental health diagnoses and delinquency); Linda A.
Teplin et al., Psychiatric Disorders in Youth in Juvenile Detention, 59 ARCHIVES
GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1133, 1133 (2002) (study of juvenile detainees concluded that:
Nearly two thirds of males and nearly three quarters of
females met diagnostic criteria for one or more psychiatric
disorders. Excluding conduct disorder (common among
detained youth), nearly 60% of males and more than two
thirds of females met diagnostic criteria and had diagnosisspecific impairment for one or more psychiatric disorders.
Half of males and almost half of females had a substance use
disorder, and more than 40% of males and females met
criteria for disruptive behavior disorders. Affective disorders
were also prevalent, especially among females; more than
20% of females met criteria for a major depressive episode.
Rates of many disorders were higher among females, nonHispanic whites, and older adolescents. These results
suggest substantial psychiatric morbidity among juvenile
detainees. Youth with psychiatric disorders pose a challenge
for the juvenile justice system and, after their release, for the
larger mental health system.
15. Wareham & Boots, supra note 14, at 1005 (citing Timothy Brezina,
Adolescent Maltreatment and Delinquency: the Question of Intervening
Processes, 35 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 71 (1998); Magda Stouthamer-Loeber et
al., Maltreatment of Boys and the Development of Disruptive and Delinquent
Behavior, 13 DEV. & PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 941 (2001)).
16. See Unique Needs of Girls in the Juvenile Justice System, PHYSICIANS
FOR
HUM.
RTS.
http://www.women.ca.gov/portals/70/media/pdf/issues/women_girls_cjs/girls.p
df (last visited Oct. 21, 2015); (65% incarcerated girls experienced PTSD
symptoms at some point in their lives); Leo Sher, Neurobiology of Suicidal
Behavior in Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, 10 EXPERT REV.
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often leads to a diagnosis of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and
other mental illnesses.17 A victim of sexual abuse is much more
likely to react violently to a perceived threat than a child who
does not suffer from PTSD.18
Take the example of the delinquent act of battery on a school
employee. In many states, battery on a school employee is a
felony.19 It is not uncommon for children at alternative schools
who have behavior issues and mental health issues to have
multiple charges under this statute.20 One child the author
represented had five such charges. On its face, this sounds like
the fourteen year-old child routinely beat up his teachers. A look
at the facts proved otherwise. One charge was based on the
child’s touching a teacher’s chest with his fingers when the
teacher looked over his shoulder while the child was on a school
computer. Another charge was based on the child lightly
smacking a teacher’s arm when she tried to move him during a
lineup. Under applicable law, battery is considered a violent
felony that can never be expunged.21 A juvenile adjudication of
delinquency for battery on a teacher would, therefore, limit the
child’s future access to student loans, preclude him from
participating in college athletics, preclude him from many
government jobs, preclude him from becoming a police officer or
firefighter and possibly bar him from entering some branches of
the military.22 Additionally, studies have shown that the earlier
NEUROTHERAPEUTICS 1233 (2010) (48% were experiencing PTSD symptoms at
time of study). Depression, trauma, anger, self-destructive behavior or other
mental health disorders were a factor for 79% of girls in residential programs
and 84% of girls in non-residential programs. Id.
17. See Martin H. Teicher, Wounds that Time Won’t Heal: The
Neurobiology of Child Abuse, 2 CEREBRUM: THE DANA FORUM ON BRAIN SCIENCE
1, 3 (2000).
17. See Martin H. Teicher, Wounds that Time Won’t Heal: The Neurobiology of
Child Abuse, 2 CEREBRUM: THE DANA FORUM ON BRAIN SCIENCE 1, 3 (2000).
18. Id.
19. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.081(2)(c) (West 2014), FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 784.03 (West 2001); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 13(d) (West 2015).
20. See generally, Tulman, supra note 11.
21. See e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 943.0581 (West 2010).
22. Under the guidelines of some athletic programs, if a child is arrested
for any violent felony, possession of a weapon on school grounds,
possession/sale of drugs on school grounds, or any other offense that can lead
to expulsion from school, the child athlete may become ineligible to participate
in the athletic program of the school including band and cheerleading. (For
further information, call NCAA Academic and Membership Affairs 317-917-
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a child enters the delinquency system, the more likely it is that
she will acquire an extensive juvenile record.23
The current proposal would allow the judge to adjudicate
the child delinquent of the charged act, but still find that, due to
significant mitigation, she should be allowed to have her record
expunged upon fulfilling certain criteria. This recognizes that
the child could form the intent to commit the charged crime, but
the response would be therapeutic rather than punitive. If the
child completes an appropriate treatment program, the charge
would not remain on the child’s record into adulthood. The child
would also be required to perform other appropriate juvenile
sanctions such as community service. In this way, the child
would learn to take responsibility for their actions, but the
underlying trauma would be acknowledged in a way that allows
the child to work towards a positive future.
This proposal is consistent with the theories of the
6008). The Army has a “waiver” process of an applicant who has received a
conviction or juvenile adjudication for a serious offense, but waivers for serious
offenses are rarely granted; the Navy and Marines require an explanation for
all juvenile cases even if the case was nolle prosse’d or non-filed, the Navy and
Marines conduct a review to ensure that the dismissal was on the merits and
not to facilitate enlistment into the Armed Forces. The Air Force has a waiver
process similar to that used by the Army but also looks at the surrounding
circumstances and the applicant’s overall record. Federal law, 24 C.F.R. §
966.4 (2010) and some local rules state that no member of a family living in
subsidized housing may engage in drug-related or violent criminal activity.
The standard used in determining whether to evict is only preponderance of
the evidence. A genuine addiction can be a defense to an eviction proceeding.
The Higher Education Act, 20 U.S.C.A § 1091 (West 2014), provides that a
person who is convicted of possession or sale of a controlled substance becomes
ineligible to receive financial aid including work study for a set period of time
depending on how many violations the child has. Many states deny
scholarships to students with a felony conviction. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §
1009.531 (West 2014) (Bright Futures and Medallion scholarships not
available to a student who has been convicted of a felony and has not been
granted clemency).
23. See Gloria Danziger, Delinquency Jurisdiction in a Unified Family
Court: Balancing Intervention, Prevention and Adjudication, 37 FAM. L. Q. 381,
386 (2003) (“[T]hose who began offending as young children were more likely
to become violent offenders. . . . [T]he earlier a youth entered the juvenile
justice system, the more likely he or she was to acquire an extensive juvenile
court record.”) (citing Howard N. Snyder., Epidemiology of Official Offending,
in CHILD DELINQUENTS: DEVELOPMENT, INTERVENTION, AND SERVICE NEEDS, 25
(Rolf Loeber & David P. Farrington eds., 2001) and Howard N. Snyder et al.,
Prevalence and Development of Child Delinquency, CHILD DELINQUENCY
BULLETIN (2003)).
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Therapeutic Jurisprudence/preventive law model that focuses
on rehabilitation rather than punishment. The theory of
Therapeutic Jurisprudence is to “broaden the counseling
mission, and . . . convert the practice of law into a helping and
healing profession in ways that may make it a much more
humanitarian tool.”24
Therapeutic Jurisprudence is inconsistent with current law
and procedure in juvenile court.
Because the collateral
consequences of a felony conviction are lifelong,25 children are
advised to invoke their right to remain silent and have almost
no role in the process. This proposal would allow the child to
testify to the circumstances of her life and how it impacted her
behavior without subjecting her to the equivalent of adult
criminal consequences.
Originally, the goal of juvenile court was rehabilitation.
That changed drastically over time,26 and now, the relevant
24. Dennis P. Stolle et al., Integrating Preventive Law and Therapeutic
Jurisprudence: A Law and Psychology Based Approach to Lawyering, 34 CAL.
W. L. REV. 15, 50 (1997).
25. See supra note 22.
26. See Tulman, supra note 11, at 3. Tulman cites a statement made on
the floor of the U.S. Senate by Senator Paul Wellstone: “Of the 100,000 children
who are arrested and incarcerated each year, as many as 50 percent suffer
from a mental or emotional disturbance.” Id. at 7. Tulman summarizes the
situation concerning children with education-related disabilities in the
delinquency system very powerfully.
The substantive and procedural convergence between
juvenile and criminal courts eliminates virtually all of the
differences in strategies of social control between youths and
adults. As a result, no reason remains to maintain a separate
juvenile court whose only distinction is its persisting
procedural deficiencies. Yet, even with the juvenile court's
transformation from an informal, rehabilitative agency into
a scaled-down criminal court, it continues to operate virtually
unreformed. The juvenile court's continued existence despite
these changes reflects an ambivalence about children and
their control, and provides an opportunity to re-examine
basic assumptions about the nature and competence of young
people.
Feld, supra note 5, at 692-93. It is also well-documented that poor and
minority children are substantially over-represented in the delinquency
population. See Heidi M. Hsia et al., Disproportionate Minority Confinement,
2002 Update, U.S. DEP’T JUST., OFF. JUST. PROGRAMS, OFF. JUV. JUST. & DELINQ.
PREVENTION 1
(2004),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/201240.pdf
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Florida Statute provides that the purpose of the delinquency
system is to first “protect the public” from acts of delinquency.27
This article will argue that the punitive model has failed and
that it is time to allow a procedure that recognizes the unique
issues faced by juveniles with mental health issues, especially
when those issues are the result of abuse.
The Supreme Court has recognized in a recent series of
cases that the brains of even normal children function entirely
differently than those of “normal” adults.28 This article will
((“Although minority youth account for about one-third of the U.S. juvenile
population, they comprise two-thirds of the juvenile detention/corrections
population.”); see also Carl E. Pope et al., Disproportionate Minority
Confinement, A Review of the Research Literature from 1989 through 2001, U.S.
DEP’T JUST., OFF. JUST. PROGRAMS, OFF. JUV. JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION, JUV.
JUST. BULL. 1 (2006), http://www.ojjdp.gov/dmc/pdf/dmc89_01.pdf.
For
excellent information about the realities of life for poor children, see NAT’L CTR.
FOR CHILD. IN POVERTY, www.nccp.org (last visited Oct. 15, 2015).
27. FLA. STAT. ANN § 985.03(12) (West 2014).
28. The United States Supreme Court has decided three landmark cases
recently that recognize the fundamental principle that children are different.
See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011) (holding that a child’s age
must be taken into account in determining whether a child was in custody for
purposes of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)); Graham v. Florida, 560
U.S. 48 (2010) (abolishing life without parole for children convicted of crimes
other than homicide); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (abolishing the
juvenile death penalty). Each of these cases relied to a large extent on
developing science demonstrating that children’s brains function in a
fundamentally different way than do the brains of adults.
The substantive and procedural convergence between
juvenile and criminal courts eliminates virtually all of the
differences in strategies of social control between youths and
adults. As a result, no reason remains to maintain a separate
juvenile court whose only distinction is its persisting
procedural deficiencies. Yet, even with the juvenile court's
transformation from an informal, rehabilitative agency into
a scaled-down criminal court, it continues to operate virtually
unreformed. The juvenile court's continued existence despite
these changes reflects an ambivalence about children and
their control, and provides an opportunity to re-examine
basic assumptions about the nature and competence of young
people.
Feld, supra note 5, at 692-93. An amicus brief relied upon by the Graham court
explains succinctly how children’s brains are different:
Research in developmental psychology and neuroscience—
including the research presented to the Court in Simmons
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argue that the lifelong consequences of a felony are
disproportionate to the conduct of children who suffer from
mental illness or live in extreme socio-economic deprivation so
that the proposed procedure is required under the Eighth
Amendment. In addition, due process is violated when a child is
forced to choose between raising an insanity defense at trial, or
taking a plea to a felony, both of which have lifelong negative
consequences.
Recent Supreme Court cases have recognized the science
underlying the common-sense notion that children are not “little
adults.” Their brains function in a completely different manner
than those of adults. In 2005, the Court abolished the juvenile
death penalty and recognized the neuroscience underlying the
and additional research conducted since Simmons was
decided—confirms and strengthens the conclusion that
juveniles, as a group, differ from adults in the salient ways
the Court identified.
Juveniles—including older
adolescents—are less able to restrain their impulses and
exercise self-control; less capable than adults of considering
alternative courses of action and maturely weighing risks
and rewards; and less oriented to the future and thus less
capable of apprehending the consequences of their oftenimpulsive actions. For all those reasons, even once their
general cognitive abilities approximate those of adults,
juveniles are less capable than adults of mature judgment,
and more likely to engage in risky, even criminal, behavior
as a result of that immaturity. Research also demonstrates
that ‘juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative
influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure,’
while at the same time they lack the freedom and autonomy
that adults possess to escape such pressures. Finally,
because juveniles are still in the process of forming a coherent
identity, adolescent crime often reflects the ‘signature’—and
transient—‘qualities of youth’ itself, rather than an
entrenched bad character. Research has documented that
the vast majority of youthful offenders will desist from
criminal behavior in adulthood. And the malleability of
adolescence means that there is no reliable way to identify
the minority who will not.
Brief for the American Psychological Association, American Psychiatric
Association, National Association of Social Workers, and Mental Health
America as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S.
48 (2009) (Nos. 08-7412, 08-7621), 2009 WL 2236778, at *3-4 (citations
omitted); Graham, 560 U.S. at 48. As the science of juvenile brain development
has advanced considerably, there have not been any corresponding major
changes in delinquency court.
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claim that those under the age of eighteen should not be subject
to the ultimate punishment due to the fundamental immaturity
of their brains.29 Later cases, discussed in depth below, followed
similar reasoning in abolishing life without parole for nonhomicides for juvenile offenders30 and in holding that juvenile
offenders cannot be subjected to a mandatory life sentence even
for homicide.31
Delinquency proceedings are proceedings in juvenile court
in which children are charged with “delinquent acts”—the
juvenile equivalent of an adult crime. In most states, the law
provides that delinquent acts are not crimes.32 While every state
has a juvenile court system today, the role of juvenile court has
changed over time; “[a]t the dawn of the twentieth century,
Progressive reformers applied the new theories of social control
to the new ideas about childhood and created a social welfare
alternative to criminal courts to treat criminal and noncriminal
misconduct by youth.”33 After several decades of reform,
delinquency courts now closely resemble adult criminal courts.34
Barry Feld has identified three types of reform affecting the
juvenile court system: jurisdictional, jurisprudential, and
procedural.35 Recent years have seen an increase in society’s
desire to criminalize the conduct of children. While penalties
have become harsher and juvenile sanctions have become more
like criminal sanctions, juvenile courts are not required to
provide children with the same protections afforded to adult
defendants.
According to Feld, “[a]lthough theoretically,
juvenile courts’ procedural safeguards closely resemble those of
criminal courts, in reality, the justice routinely afforded
juveniles is lower than the minimum insisted upon for adults.”36
Feld argues:
The substantive and procedural convergence
29. Roper, 543 U.S. at 551, 573-74, 578.
30. Graham, 560 U.S. at 48, 68-69, 80.
31. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2482 (2012).
32. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.35(6) (West 2007); GA. CODE ANN. § 1511-606 (West 2014); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 380.1 (McKinney 2007).
33. Feld, supra note 5, at 691.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 692.
36. Id.
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between juvenile and criminal courts eliminates
virtually all of the differences in strategies of
social control between youths and adults. As a
result, no reason remains to maintain a separate
juvenile court whose only distinction is its
persisting procedural deficiencies. Yet, even with
the juvenile court’s transformation from an
informal, rehabilitative agency into a scaled-down
criminal court, it continues to operate virtually
unreformed. The juvenile court’s continued
existence despite these changes reflects an
ambivalence about children and their control, and
provides an opportunity to re-examine basic
assumptions about the nature and competence of
young people.37
Historically, youth in delinquency court were not afforded
all of the protections given to adults facing criminal charges.38
This was because juvenile court was seen as a way for the state
to step in where children were engaging in socially unacceptable
behavior, often due to lack of supervision at home.39 Some have
noted a distinct class element to early juvenile courts, arguing
that such courts were a way for society to exercise control over

37. Id. at 692-93.
38. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15 (1967).
The early reformers were appalled by adult procedures and
penalties, and by the fact that children could be given long
prison sentences and mixed in jails with hardened criminals.
They were profoundly convinced that society's duty to the
child could not be confined by the concept of justice alone.
They believed that society's role was not to ascertain whether
the child was ‘guilty’ or ‘innocent,’ but ‘What is he, how has
he become what he is, and what had best be done in his
interest and in the interest of the state to save him from a
downward career.' The child—essentially good, as they saw
it—was to be made ‘to feel that he is the object of (the state's)
care and solicitude,’ not that he was under arrest or on trial.
The rules of criminal procedure were therefore altogether
inapplicable.
39. William W. Booth, History and Philosophy of the Juvenile Court, FL.
JUV. L. & PRAC. § 1.6 (2013).
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“lower-class” youth.40 A report submitted by the Cook County
(Illinois) Bar Association to the Illinois state legislature in
support of the creation of the first juvenile court stated that:
The fundamental idea of the Juvenile Court Law
is that the State must step in and exercise
guardianship over a child found under such
adverse social or individual conditions as develop
crime. . . . It proposes a plan whereby he may be
treated, not as a criminal, or legally charged with
a crime, but as a ward of the state.41
Over time, however, the courts, including the United States
Supreme Court, began to recognize that the ideal of kindly
juvenile judges who used their wide discretion to help at-risk
children was far from the reality faced every day by children in
delinquency court.42 In the seminal case of In re Gault, the
United States Supreme Court stated:
Juvenile Court history has again demonstrated
that unbridled discretion, however benevolently
motivated, is frequently a poor substitute for
principle and procedure. In 1937, Dean Pound
wrote: ‘The powers of the Star Chamber were a
40. Id.
Early juvenile law generally grew from citizen concern for
children who, lacking parental control, discipline, and
supervision, were coming before the criminal court for
truancy, begging, homelessness, and petty criminal activity.
There were distinct social phenomena that contributed to
these problems, including a large population of children from
broken families in the aftermath of the Civil War, latchkey
children of parents who were unable to provide supervision
during long work hours, lack of child care, and lack of free or
compulsory education for children.
41. Id. at § 1.2.
42. In Gault, the Court traced the historical development of juvenile
delinquency court and demonstrated that, as the consequences of a juvenile
adjudication of delinquency became more severe, procedures similar to those
used in adult criminal court were required by the Due Process Clause. In re
Gault, 387 U.S. at 13-18.
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trifle in comparison with those of our juvenile
courts . . . . The absence of substantive standards
has not necessarily meant that children receive
careful, compassionate, individualized treatment.
The absence of procedural rules based upon
constitutional principle has not always produced
fair,
efficient,
and
effective
procedures.
Departures from established principles of due
process have frequently resulted not in
enlightened procedure, but in arbitrariness.43
The facts of Gault demonstrate just how dangerous giving
any judge unbridled discretion can be. One afternoon in 1964, a
fifteen-year-old named Gerald Francis Gault and a friend
purportedly made a prank phone call.44 As eloquently described
by Justice Fortas, the calls “were of the irritatingly offensive,
adolescent, sex variety.”45 At the time of the “offense,” Gerald
was on probation because he had been caught in the company of
another teenager who stole a wallet.46 Gerald was taken into
custody while both of his parents were at work.47 No notice was
left for the parents, and no attempt was made to contact them to
let them know that their son was in custody.48 Upon learning of
her son’s whereabouts from a neighbor, Gerald’s mother went to
the detention home, where Gerald’s probation officer told her of
her son’s alleged acts and informed her that there would be a
hearing the next day.49 The probation officer filed a petition in
juvenile court that Gerald’s parents did not see until a federal
habeas proceeding was brought.50 The petition did not allege
any factual basis for the court proceeding.51 At the “hearing” the
next day, the complainant was not present, and no transcript or
written memorandum of the proceedings was created.52 Gerald
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 18-19.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 5.
Id.
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was questioned by the judge but was not told that he had a right
to remain silent.53 A few days later, without explanation, Gerald
was released.54 Shortly thereafter, his parents were notified
simply that there would be another hearing.55 Once again, the
complainant was not present, and Gerald testified without
having been advised of his constitutional rights.56 Gerald’s
mother specifically requested the presence of the complainant so
that she could identify which of the two boys had actually made
the lewd remarks.57 At the hearing, a referral report was sent
to the court by the probation officers, but was not sent to Gerald
or his parents.58 At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge
committed Gerald to the State Industrial School as a juvenile
delinquent until his twenty-first birthday, “unless sooner
discharged by due process of law.”59 At no point were Gerald or
his parents advised that he had a right to counsel.60 In essence,
Gerald was sentenced to six years in juvenile prison for a prank
phone call without any notice of the charges, without having
been able to cross-examine the complainant, without knowledge
that he could remain silent, and without the advice of counsel.
In Gault, the Court reevaluated the juvenile justice system
and held that many of the fundamental protections afforded to
criminal defendants must be afforded to children facing charges
in delinquency court. The Court noted the severe consequences
of a juvenile adjudication of delinquency, and stated that “it
would be extraordinary if our Constitution did not require the
procedural regularity and the exercise of care implied in the
phrase ‘due process.’ Under our Constitution, the condition of
being a boy does not justify a kangaroo court.”61
The Court held that due process requires that children be
given notice of the charges against them,62 that the Sixth and

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 7.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 7-8.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 27-28.
Id. at 31-34.
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Fourteenth Amendments require that children be advised of
their right to counsel, that they be provided with counsel if they
cannot afford counsel,63 that the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth
Amendments require that children be able to confront and crossexamine the witnesses against them, and that children may
invoke the right against self-incrimination.64
The Court
specifically rejected the argument that this right should not
apply to children because confession is therapeutic.65 A few
Due process of law requires notice of the sort we have
described—that is, notice which would be deemed
constitutionally adequate in a civil or criminal proceeding. It
does not allow a hearing to be held in which a youth’s freedom
and his parents’ right to his custody are at stake without
giving them timely notice, in advance of the hearing, of the
specific issues that they must meet.
Id. at 33-34.
63. Id. at 36.
The juvenile needs the assistance of counsel to cope with
problems of law, to make skilled inquiry into the facts, to
insist upon regularity of the proceedings, and to ascertain
whether he has a defense and to prepare and submit it. The
child ‘requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in
the proceedings against him.
(footnote omitted) (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 61 (1932)).
64. Gault, 387 U.S. at 42-57. (“It would indeed be surprising if the
privilege against self-incrimination were available to hardened criminals but
not to children.”). Id. at 47. While the Court declined to rule on the child’s
argument that the Constitution requires appellate review of juvenile
delinquency proceedings and the right to a transcript of such proceedings, most
states provide for transcription of delinquency proceedings and appellate
review of these proceedings. See, e.g., FLA. R. JUV. PROC. 8.830 (West 2015)
(providing for written transcripts of all proceedings in delinquency court); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 985.534 (West 2007) (providing a right to appeal from an
adjudication of delinquency).
65. Gault, 387 U.S. at 51.
It is also urged . . . that the juvenile and presumably his
parents should not be advised of the juvenile’s right to silence
because confession is good for the child as the commencement
of the assumed therapy of the juvenile court process, and he
should be encouraged to assume an attitude of trust and
confidence toward the officials of the juvenile process. This
proposition has been subjected to widespread challenge on
the basis of current reappraisals of the rhetoric and realities
of the handling of juvenile offenders. In fact, evidence is
accumulating that confessions by juveniles do not aid in
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years later, the Court held that every element of the offense
charged in a petition for delinquency must be proven to the trier
of fact beyond a reasonable doubt.66 However, a year later, the
Court held that children are not entitled to a jury in delinquency
proceedings.67 In most states, a juvenile judge presides over all
pretrial proceedings and the adjudicatory hearing.68
The Court’s rationale in holding that children are not
entitled to a jury in delinquency proceedings was based upon the
notion that juvenile proceedings are supposed to be
rehabilitative rather than punitive. The standard of due process
required in juvenile delinquency proceedings, as developed in
Gault and Winship, is “fundamental fairness.”69
Despite
acknowledging the many flaws in the juvenile system as it
existed at the time—and acknowledging that the juvenile
system could impose the functional equivalent of prison on
children—the Court held that a jury is not required in a
delinquency proceeding. The Court explained:
Concern about the inapplicability of exclusionary
and other rules of evidence, about the juvenile
‘individualized treatment,’ as the court below put it, and that
compelling the child to answer questions, without warning or
advice as to his right to remain silent, does not serve this or
any other good purpose. . . . it seems probable that where
children are induced to confess by ‘paternal’ urgings on the
part of officials and the confession is then followed by
disciplinary action, the child’s reaction is likely to be hostile
and adverse—the child may well feel that he has been led or
tricked into confession and that despite his confession, he is
being punished.
Id. at 51-52.
66. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364-69 (1970) (noting that “the Due
Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof
beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with
which he is charged.” Id. at 364, and that such a right is applicable to children
“during the adjudicatory stage of a delinquency proceeding[.]” Id. at 368).
67. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 549-50 (1971) (holding
that a jury is not constitutionally required in juvenile delinquency
proceedings).
68. See, e.g., FLA. R. JUV. PROC. 8.110(c) (West 2015) (“The adjudicatory
hearing shall be conducted by the judge without a jury. At this hearing the
court determines whether the allegations of the petition have been
sustained.”).
69. See McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 543.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss2/5

18

576

PACE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 36:2

court judge’s possible awareness of the juvenile’s
prior record and of the contents of the social file;
about repeated appearances of the same familiar
witnesses in the persons of juvenile and probation
officers and social workers—all to the effect that
this will create the likelihood of pre-judgment—
chooses to ignore it seems to us, every aspect of
fairness, of concern, of sympathy, and of paternal
attention that the juvenile court system
contemplates.70
While the primary purpose of juvenile court may at one
point have been rehabilitation,71 that is no longer the case today.
The legislative intent for the juvenile justice system in most
states72 is to protect the public from acts of delinquency.73
Preventing delinquency, strengthening the family, early
intervention, and rehabilitation are often listed as secondary
goals of the juvenile justice system.74 It appears that Justice
Fortas’ warning in Kent over forty years ago is more applicable
today than ever: “[T]here may be grounds for concern that the
child receives the worst of both worlds: that he gets neither the

70. Id. at 550.
71. See generally Feld, supra note 5.
72. A few states, however, still prioritize the rehabilitation and care of the
child. See, e.g., LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 801 (1992) (providing that each child
facing delinquency proceedings receive the “care, guidance and control that
will be conducive to his welfare . . . .”); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-402 (1994)
(providing for “individualized accountability and individualized treatment . . .
.” in the delinquency system).
73. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-2-102 (West 1997) (“[T]he intent
of this article is to protect, restore, and improve the public safety by creating a
system of juvenile justice that will appropriately sanction juveniles who violate
the law and, in certain cases, will also provide the opportunity to bring together
affected victims, the community, and juvenile offenders for restorative
purposes.”); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.02(3) (West 1997) (stating that legislative
intent of the juvenile justice system is “to first protect the public from acts of
delinquency.”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 3085c(c)(1)(A) (2013) (stating that a
juvenile justice system should “[h]old juveniles accountable for their unlawful
conduct.”); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 938.01(2) (West 2009) (“It is the intent of the
legislature to promote a juvenile justice system capable of dealing with the
problem of juvenile delinquency, a system which will protect the community,
impose accountability for violations of law and equip juvenile offenders with
competencies to live responsibly and productively.”).
74. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 985.02(3)(a)-(d) (West 2014).
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protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and
regenerative treatment postulated for children.”75
As noted above, the United States Supreme Court has
recently decided several landmark cases recognizing the
fundamental principle that children are different from adults.76
Each of these cases relied to a large extent on developing science
demonstrating that children’s brains function in a
fundamentally different manner than those of adults. As the
Roper Court noted, teenagers are generally less mature, more
prone to reckless behavior, and much more susceptible to
negative influences than adults; the possibility of rehabilitation
is also greater for teenagers than for adults.77 An amicus brief
relied upon by the Graham court explains succinctly how
children’s brains are different. For example, even older
adolescents “are less able to restrain their impulses and exercise
self-control; less capable than adults of considering alternative
courses of action and maturely weighing risks and rewards; and
less oriented to the future and thus less capable of apprehending
the consequences of their often-impulsive actions.”78 Teenagers
are much more likely to be influenced by negative peers and,
because they are not adults, lack the autonomy to escape such
influences even if they desire to do so.79 Because a significant
amount of juvenile criminal behavior is attributable to the
transient characteristics of youth, research has shown that the
vast majority of youthful offenders do not continue to engage in
criminal behavior as adults.80 Yet as the science of juvenile
75. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966).
76. See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2406 (2011) (holding
that a child’s age must be taken into account in determining whether a child
was in custody when "the child's age was known . . . or would have been
objectively apparent to a reasonable officer” for purposes of Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010)
(abolishing life without parole for children convicted of crimes other than
homicide); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2004) (abolishing the juvenile
death penalty).
77. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569-70.
78. Brief for the American Psychological Association, American
Psychiatric Association, National Association of Social Workers, and Mental
Health America as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 3-4, Graham v.
Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (Nos. 08-7412, 08-7621), 2009 WL 2236778, at *4
(citations omitted).
79. Id.
80. Id.
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brain development has advanced considerably, there have not
been any corresponding major changes in the way cases are
transferred from delinquency court to adult criminal court.
The Court has long recognized that cognitive functioning is
relevant to an Eighth Amendment analysis of a particular
punishment.81 In the context of the death penalty, the Court
specifically recognized that youth is a mitigating factor that
must be considered by the sentencing jury.82 In 1982, prior to
the recent progress in developmental neuroscience, the Supreme
Court recognized the fundamental, commonsense fact that
children are different than adults.83 The Court stated that “the
chronological age of a minor is itself a relevant mitigating factor
of great weight, so must the background and mental and
emotional development of a youthful defendant be duly
considered in sentencing.”84
Further, in 2002, the Court expressly recognized the link
between cognitive functioning and criminal culpability.85 In
holding that the Eighth Amendment bars the execution of the
mentally retarded, the Court held that “[b]ecause of their
disabilities in areas of reasoning, judgment, and control of their
impulses, [mentally retarded offenders] do not act with the level
of moral culpability that characterizes the most serious adult
criminal conduct.”86 This holding provided the basis for the
Court’s decision in Roper, which banned the juvenile death
penalty.87 In Roper, the Court recognized that developmental
neuroscience has demonstrated that the brains of teenagers are
fundamentally different from those of adults in ways that
81. See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (holding that the
Eighth Amendment requires a capital sentencing jury to be allowed to consider
“any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the circumstances
of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than
death.”); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 163-64 (1976) (holding that, in order
to comply with the Eighth Amendment, the jury must consider any mitigating
circumstances). While Lockett and Gregg were capital cases, their recognition
that the Eighth Amendment requires consideration of any relevant mitigating
factors is applicable to the analysis that follows.
82. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 116 (1982).
83. Id. at 115-16.
84. Id. at 116.
85. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (holding that the Eighth
Amendment bars the execution of the mentally retarded).
86. Id. at 306.
87. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
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directly affect culpability,88 noting that “[t]he susceptibility of
juveniles to immature and irresponsible behavior means ‘their
irresponsible conduct is not as morally reprehensible as that of
an adult.’”89 Indeed, “[t]he relevance of youth as a mitigating
factor derives from the fact that the signature qualities of youth
are transient; as individuals mature, the impetuousness and
recklessness that may dominate in younger years can subside.”90
In Graham, the Court, relying on Roper, recognized that “[t]hese
salient characteristics mean that ‘[i]t is difficult even for expert
psychologists to differentiate between the juvenile offender
whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and
the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable
corruption.’”91
In Roper, the Court relied on several scientific studies
analyzing juvenile brain development.92 Several professional
associations wrote and submitted an amicus brief to the Roper
court.93 The amicus brief in Roper detailed the ways in which
the brains of youth differ in structure and functioning from those
of adults.94 The authors explained that the regions of the brain
associated with impulse control, regulation of emotions, risk
assessment, and moral reasoning are among the last to develop,
and often are not fully developed until the early to midtwenties.95 The authors also found that “[p]sychosocial maturity
88. Id. at 570 (noting that the personality traits of children are less formed
than those of adults).
89. Id. (citing Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988) (plurality
opinion)).
90. Id. (citation omitted).
91. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010) (citing Roper v. Simmons,
543 U.S. 551, 573 (2004)).
92. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 569 (citing Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S.
Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity,
Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 1014 (2003)).
93. Brief of the American Medical Association, American Psychiatric
Association, American Society for Adolescent Psychiatry, American Academy
of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry, American Academy of Psychiatry and the
Law, National Association of Social Workers, Missouri Chapter of the National
Association of Social Workers, and National Mental Health Association as
Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 4, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551
(2004) (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 1633549, at *1 [hereinafter Roper Brief].
94. See id.
95. Id. at *4 (noting that the tests that formed the basis of its conclusions
were performed on healthy adolescents and that those in the criminal justice
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is incomplete until age 19.”96 In a finding of particular relevance
to youth involved in the juvenile justice system, the authors cited
studies showing that “the deficiencies in the adolescent mind
and emotional and social development are especially pronounced
when other factors—such as stress, emotions, and peer
pressure—enter the equation. These factors . . . operate on the
adolescent mind differently and with special force.”97
Further, scientists confirm that “[a]dolescents’ behavioral
immaturity mirrors the anatomical immaturity of their
brains.”98 Studies have shown that adolescents rely more than
adults on the amygdala, the area of the brain associated with
the primitive impulses of anger, aggression, and fear.99 In
contrast, adults tend to process similar information through the
frontal cortex, a cerebral area associated with impulse control
and good judgment.100 The frontal and pre-frontal cortex, critical
areas of the brain that control impulse, judgment, risk-taking,
and weighing consequences, are among the last to develop and,
often, are not fully developed until the mid-twenties.101
The picture below contains MRI images that demonstrate
the structural changes that take place in the brain from ages five
to twenty.102 Researchers at the National Institutes of Health,
the National Institute of Mental Health, and the University of
system often “suffer from serious psychological disturbances that substantially
exacerbate the already existing vulnerabilities of youth, [such that] they can
be expected to function at sub-standard levels”).
96. Id. at *7 (“Adolescents ‘score lower on measures of self-reliance and
other aspects of personal responsibility, they have more difficulty seeing things
in long-term perspective, they are less likely to look at things from the
perspective of others, and they have more difficulty restraining their
aggressive impulses.’”).
97. Id. at *7-8. “Stress affects cognitive abilities, including the ability to
weigh costs and benefits and to override impulses with rational thought. But
adolescents are more susceptible to stress from daily events than adults, which
translates into further distortion of the already skewed cost-benefit analysis.”
Id. at *8.
98. Id. at *11.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at *6-8.
102. Paul Thompson, The Adolescent Brain—Why Teenagers Think and
Act
Differently,
EDINFORMATICS
http://www.edinformatics.com/news/teenage_brains.htm (last visited Oct. 7,
2015) (depicting MRI images taken from time-lapse imaging tracking brain
maturation from ages five to twenty).
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California at Los Angeles conducted a decade-long study using
magnetic resonance imaging to track the development of the
brain.103 The study concluded that “‘higher-order’ brain centers,
such as the prefrontal cortex, don’t fully develop until young
adulthood as grey matter104 wanes in a back-to-front wave as the
brain matures and neural connections are pruned.”105 In the
MRI scans below, red indicates more grey matter and blue
indicates less grey matter.106 As any adult can attest, teenagers
lack the “brakes” that keep them from engaging in impulsive and
reckless activities.107 The “brakes” are located in the frontal
lobe—the last part of the brain to develop.108 Many other
changes take place in the brain between birth and adulthood.109

103. Id.
104. Roper Brief, supra note 93, at *18-20. One of the last parts of the
brain to mature is the pre-frontal cortex. Id. at 16. This process is known as
“pruning”; pruning of gray matter improves the functioning of the brain’s
reasoning centers by establishing some pathways while extinguishing others,
thereby enhancing brain functioning. Id. at *18.
105. Thompson, supra note 102.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See Roper Brief, supra note 93, at *15-17.

Id.

[T]he limbic system is more active in adolescent brains than
adult brains, particularly in the region of the amygdala and
that the frontal lobes of the adolescent brain are less active. .
. . [A]s teenagers grow into adults, they increasingly shift the
overall focus of brain activity to the frontal lobes. . . . [T]he
brain’s frontal lobes are still structurally immature well into
late adolescence. The prefrontal cortex (which [is] associated
with impulse control, risk assessment, and moral reasoning)
is ‘one of the last brain regions to mature.’ . . . [Additionally,]
[m]yelination is the process by which the brain’s axons are
coated with a fatty white substance called myelin. . . . ‘The
presence of myelin makes communication between different
parts of the brain faster and more reliable. Myelination . . .
continues through adolescence and into adulthood.
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As noted above, these conclusions were drawn from studies
performed on the brains of normal adolescents. Many of the
youth facing charges in delinquency court are at-risk youth who
are either in foster care or unstable, often violent homes110; if
110. See Tulman, supra note 11, at 7 (“Of the 100,000 children who are
arrested and incarcerated each year, as many as 50 percent suffer from a
mental or emotional disturbance.”). Tulman powerfully summarizes the
situation concerning children with education-related disabilities in the
delinquency system, noting that:
Poor educational performance among children in the delinquency
system is, in significant part, a function of the high percentage of
children in that system who have education-related disabilities
and who, more particularly, have not received the benefit of
appropriate, and effective special education services. Indeed, the
majority of children in the juvenile delinquency system are
children with education-related disabilities. The delinquency
system disproportionately attracts children with educationrelated disabilities both because those children are more likely to
engage in delinquent conduct than their non-disabled peers and
because the adults responsible for educational and delinquency
systems are more likely to label and treat children with
education-related disabilities as delinquent.
Poor educational outcomes that are pervasive among children in
the delinquency system constitute, in several respects, compelling
evidence that school system and delinquency system personnel
are failing to deliver appropriate educational services and failing
to accommodate children with disabilities. The outcomes also,
however, often reflect failure by school system and delinquency
system personnel even to recognize education-related disabilities.
These outcomes suggest, furthermore, that decision-makers
guarding the gates to the delinquency system generally, and to
incarceration facilities particularly, treat children with
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they attend school at all, they attend alternative schools.111. It
is also well documented that poor and minority children are
substantially over-represented in the delinquency population.112
In criminal law, the law not only punishes the alleged act,
but also the state of mind, or intent, of the defendant. For
example, in Florida, a premeditated murder committed in the
course of certain enumerated felonies is a capital crime.113 By
contrast, a homicide that occurs during one of the enumerated
education-related disabilities differently than children who are
not disabled. In vastly disproportionate numbers, children who
are poor and who are members of racial and ethnic minority
groups populate the delinquency system. The disproportionate
numbers, moreover, reflect the harsh reality that society imposes
unequal and discriminatory treatment upon poor children of
color.
Researchers and journalists have documented the
disproportionate representation and disparate, discriminatory
treatment of children based upon race and class. In contrast,
disproportionate representation and disparate, discriminatory
treatment within the delinquency system of children with
disabilities has not been sufficiently studied and documented.
Estimates of the correlation between delinquency and disabilities
vary widely.
Id. at 4-5.
111. The term “alternative school” is used to describe schools where
students are transferred for disciplinary reasons or because they have been
suspended or expelled from mainstream schools. See Maureen Carroll,
Racialized Assumptions and Constitutional Harm: Claims of Injury Based on
Public School Assignment, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 903, 905-06 (2011).

Id.
26.

In a typical disciplinary transfer case, the student has been
involuntary transferred from a mainstream school to an
alternative program without the procedural safeguards that
accompany formal expulsions. Many alternative schools used
for this purpose have limited classroom instruction, strict
disciplinary procedures, and no extracurricular activities.
Often, the only students attending an alternative school are
those placed involuntarily for disciplinary or remedial
reasons. Students attending disciplinary programs face a
dramatically higher risk of violence than those attending
mainstream schools.
Moreover, because of curricular
differences, students returning to a mainstream school from
an alternative program may be unable to advance to the next
grade or to graduate with their peers.
112. See Hsia et al., supra note 26; see also Carl E. Pope et al., supra note
113. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04(1)(a) (West 2015).
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felonies without any design to effect death is a second-degree
felony with a maximum fifteen-year sentence.114 There is no
requirement in the law that courts evaluate a child’s ability to
form criminal intent before the child is transferred to adult
court.
Many children facing charges in delinquency court are also
in dependency proceedings, meaning that they have been
abused, abandoned, or neglected by their parent(s).115 Many
other juvenile defendants have been victims of serious—often
violent—physical, sexual, and emotional abuse.116 This type of
abuse has a direct impact on the functioning of the areas of the
brain that control impulsive, risky, and unlawful behavior.117
Even before recent advances in neuroscience, psychologists
recognized that adolescents do not form intent in the same
manner as adults. As Dr. Marty Beyer, a leading expert in the
area, explained: “[f]rom a psychological perspective, intention in
children is a complex area, particularly considering their limited
capacity to think ahead to the unforeseen long-term
consequences of their immediate action.”118 Critically, Dr. Beyer
concluded “that from the standpoint of cognitive development,
young people have diminished capacity to intend harm to others
or anticipate harm as an unintended consequence of their
actions.”119 Teenagers often demonstrate a disconnect between
their actions and the resulting consequence.120 Many teenagers
see their behavior as the only option in a certain situation, but
fail to recognize their responsibility for putting themselves in
the situation in the first place.121 This “adolescent disconnect
between one action and another goes to the heart of culpability
114. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.082(6)(d) (West 2014).
115. See generally Denise C. Herz et al., Challenges Facing Crossover
Youth: An Examination of Juvenile-Justice Decision Making and Recidivism,
48 FAM. CT. REV. 305 (2010).
116. Id.
117. See Understanding the Effects of Maltreatment on Brain
Development,
CHILD
WELFARE
INFORMATION
GATEWAY
(2009),
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/brain_development.pdf.
118. Marty Beyer, Recognizing the Child in the Delinquent, 7 KY. CHILD.
RTS. J. 16, 18 (1999) (“Carrying a weapon and even using a weapon does not
mean a child had adult intent to harm.”).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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and results from an immature thought process (not anticipating
unintended consequences; reacting to threat) and incomplete
moral development . . . .”122
Abuse, trauma, and neglect further impact a young person’s
ability to form intent, as these factors can significantly alter
brain development.123 This abuse includes emotional abuse.124
After conducting extensive research, Dr. Martin Teicher
concluded that “early maltreatment, even exclusively
psychological abuse, has enduring negative effects on brain
development.”125 In an observation particularly relevant to the
appropriate punishment for young offenders, Dr. Teicher
explained:
Physical, sexual, and psychological trauma in
childhood may lead to psychiatric difficulties that
show up in childhood, adolescence, or adulthood.
The victim’s anger, shame, and despair can be
directed inward to spawn symptoms such as
depression, anxiety, suicidal ideation, and posttraumatic stress, or directed outward as
aggression,
impulsiveness,
delinquency,
hyperactivity, and substance abuse.126
Some of the disorders strongly associated with child abuse
are those that may cause unlawful behavior, such as borderline
personality disorder or dissociative identity disorder.127
Similarly, victims of child abuse may suffer from post-traumatic
stress disorder (“PTSD”), the symptoms of which include
“irritability or outbursts of anger” and “an exaggerated startle
response.”128 Dr. Teicher argues that “the trauma of abuse
induces a cascade of effects, including changes in hormones and
neurotransmitters that mediate development of vulnerable
brain regions.”129
Dr. Teicher and other scientists have
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss2/5

Id. at 18-19.
See Teicher, supra note 17.
Id.
Id. at 1.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 4.
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identified “a constellation of brain abnormalities associated with
child abuse,” including limbic irritability,130 deficient
development, differentiation of the left hemisphere,131 deficient
left-right hemisphere interaction,132 and abnormal activity in
the cerebellar vermis (the middle strip between the two
hemispheres of the brain).133 Of particular relevance here are
the effects of abuse on the development of the hippocampus,
which is involved in regulating memory and emotion.134 Dr.
Teicher’s findings demonstrate that child abuse has a direct
impact on the ability of a youthful offender to form intent:
To be convicted of a crime in the United States,
one supposedly must have the capacity to both
know right from wrong and to control one’s
behavior. Those with a history of childhood abuse
may know right from wrong, but their brains may
be so irritable and the connections from the
logical, rational hemispheres so weak that intense
negative (right-hemisphere) emotions may
incapacitate their use of logic and reason to
control their aggressive impulses. Is it just to hold
people criminally responsible for acts they lack
the neurological capacity to control?135

130. Id. at 4-5 (“Limbic irritability [is] manifested by markedly increased
prevalence of symptoms suggestive of temporal lobe epilepsy (TLE) and by an
increased incidence of clinically significant EEG (brain wave) abnormalities.”).
131. Id. at 5 (“[This process is] manifested throughout the cerebral cortex
and the hippocampus, which is involved in memory retrieval.”).
132. Id. at 6. (“[This process is] indicated by marked shifts in hemispheric
activity during memory recall and by underdevelopment of the middle portions
of the corpus callosum, the primary pathway connecting the two
hemispheres.”).
133. Id. (“[This] appears to play an important role in emotional and
attentional balance and regulates electrical activity within the limbic
system.”).
134. Id. (“Cells in the hippocampus have an unusually large number of
receptors that respond to the stress hormone cortisol. Since animal studies
show that exposure to high levels of stress hormones like cortisol has toxic
effects on the developing hippocampus, this brain region may be adversely
affected by severe stress in childhood.”).
135. Id.
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While studies demonstrate that every child’s brain develops
differently, and that such development directly impacts the
child’s ability to form intent and, ultimately, the appropriate
punishment for the child’s offense, the decision about whether to
transfer a case to adult court is often made by a prosecutor who
knows only the facts of the crime. As shown below, the Eighth
Amendment requires that all relevant factors—including
cognitive functioning, brain development, child abuse and
neglect, educational neglect, mental illness, and many others
unique to each child’s case—must be considered by a neutral
trier of fact before a child is adjudicated delinquent of a serious
offense with no opportunity to expunge her record in the future.
The concept of mitigation derives largely from the Supreme
Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence in death penalty
cases. The Court has described the concept of mitigation and its
relevance in capital sentencing proceedings many times.136 In
136.

[W]e conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
require that the sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital
case, not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating
factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and
any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant
proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death. We
recognize that, in noncapital cases, the established practice
of individualized sentences rests not on constitutional
commands, but on public policy enacted into statutes. The
considerations that account for the wide acceptance of
individualization of sentences in noncapital cases surely
cannot be thought less important in capital cases. Given that
the imposition of death by public authority is so profoundly
different from all other penalties, we cannot avoid the
conclusion that an individualized decision is essential in
capital cases. The need for treating each defendant in a
capital case with that degree of respect due the uniqueness of
the individual is far more important than in noncapital cases.
A variety of flexible techniques-probation, parole, work
furloughs, to name a few-and various postconviction
remedies may be available to modify an initial sentence of
confinement in noncapital cases. The nonavailability of
corrective or modifying mechanisms with respect to an
executed capital sentence underscores the need for
individualized consideration as a constitutional requirement
in imposing the death sentence.
There is no perfect
procedure for deciding in which cases governmental
authority should be used to impose death. But a statute that
prevents the sentencer in all capital cases from giving
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determining that differences in brain function preclude children
from being executed and from serving life without parole for a
non-homicide, the Supreme Court intent and, ultimately, the
appropriate punishment for a child who is currently serving a
life sentence.
A review of the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence demonstrates that it violates the constitutional
requirement of proportionality to adjudicate an abused or
mentally ill child delinquent of a serious offense without giving
them the opportunity to have that charge expunged from their
record in the future. It is fundamental that “[a] punishment is
‘excessive,’ and therefore prohibited by the [Eighth]
Amendment, if it is not graduated and proportioned to the
offense.”137 The Court determines if a punishment is excessive
by reviewing “currently prevailing standards of decency.”138 In
independent mitigating weight to aspects of the defendant's
character and record and to circumstances of the offense
proffered in mitigation creates the risk that the death penalty
will be imposed in spite of factors which may call for a less
severe penalty. When the choice is between life and death,
that risk is unacceptable and incompatible with the
commands of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-05 (1978); see also Wiggins v. Smith, 539
U.S. 510, 512-13 (2003).
The mitigating evidence counsel failed to discover and
present here is powerful. Wiggins experienced severe
privation and abuse while in the custody of his alcoholic,
absentee mother and physical torment, sexual molestation,
and repeated rape while in foster care. His time spent
homeless and his diminished mental capacities further
augment his mitigation case. He thus has the kind of troubled
history relevant to assessing a defendant's moral culpability.
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989) (“‘[E]vidence about the defendant's
background and character is relevant because of the belief, long held by this
society, that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to a
disadvantaged background . . . may be less culpable than defendants who have
no such excuse’”); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982) (noting that
consideration of the offender's life history is a “‘part of the process of inflicting
the penalty of death’”); Lockett, 438 U.S. at 606 (invalidating Ohio law that did
not permit consideration of aspects of a defendant's background).
137. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 304 (2002) (citing Weems v. United
States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910)).
138. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99-101 (1958).
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determining whether a punishment violates the Eighth
Amendment, the Court looks at whether the punishment is
consistent with “evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society.”139 In Atkins, the Court
explained that “[p]roportionality review under such evolving
standards should be informed by objective factors to the
maximum possible extent, the clearest and most reliable of
which is the legislation enacted by the country’s legislatures.”140
However, it is important to note that the Court does not require
state legislative action in order to determine that a punishment
violates the Eighth Amendment: “[T]he Constitution
contemplates that this Court will bring its own judgment to bear
by asking whether there is reason to agree or disagree with the
judgment reached by the citizenry and its legislators.”141

The exact scope of the constitutional phrase ‘cruel and
unusual’ has not been detailed by this Court. But the basic
policy reflected in these words is firmly established in the
Anglo-American tradition of criminal justice. The phrase in
our Constitution was taken directly from the English
Declaration of Rights of 1688, and the principle it represents
can be traced back to the Magna Carta. The basic concept
underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the
dignity of man. While the State has the power to punish, the
Amendment stands to assure that this power be exercised
within the limits of civilized standards. Fines, imprisonment
and even execution may be imposed depending upon the
enormity of the crime, but any technique outside the bounds
of these traditional penalties is constitutionally suspect. This
Court has had little occasion to give precise content to the
Eighth Amendment, and, in an enlightened democracy such
as ours, this is not surprising. But when the Court was
confronted with a punishment of 12 years in irons at hard
and painful labor imposed for the crime of falsifying public
records, it did not hesitate to declare that the penalty was
cruel in its excessiveness and unusual in its character. The
Court recognized in that case that the words of the
Amendment are not precise, and that their scope is not static.
The Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society.
Id. (citation omitted).
139. Id. at 101.
140. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 304 (citations omitted).
141. Id. (citing Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977)).
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In Eddings v. Oklahoma,142 the Supreme Court recognized
that youth is a mitigating factor that must be taken into account
at sentencing in a capital case:
All of this does not suggest an absence of
responsibility for the crime of murder,
deliberately committed in this case. Rather, it is
to say that just as the chronological age of a minor
is itself a relevant mitigating factor of great
weight, so must the background and mental and
emotional development of a youthful defendant be
duly considered in sentencing.143
In 1989, the Supreme Court reversed a death sentence
because the then-applicable jury instructions did not allow the
jury to give effect to the compelling mitigating evidence
presented of childhood trauma and intellectual disability.144 The
Court explained the concept of mitigation: “‘[E]vidence about the
defendant’s background and character is relevant because of the
belief, long held by this society, that defendants who commit
criminal acts that are attributable to a disadvantaged
background, or to emotional and mental problems, may be less
culpable than defendants who have no such excuse.’”145 The
court held that “‘the sentence imposed at the penalty stage

142. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 116 (1982).
143. Id. at 116.
Even the normal 16-year-old customarily lacks the maturity
of an adult. In this case, Eddings was not a normal 16-yearold; he had been deprived of the care, concern, and paternal
attention that children deserve. On the contrary, it is not
disputed that he was a juvenile with serious emotional
problems, and had been raised in a neglectful, sometimes
even violent, family background. In addition, there was
testimony that Eddings' mental and emotional development
were at a level several years below his chronological age.
Id.

144. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 322-23 (1989), abrogated by
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
145. Id. at 319 (citing California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987)
(O’Connor, J., concurring).
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should reflect a reasoned moral response to the defendant’s
background, character, and crime.’”146
In Atkins, the court followed its reasoning in Penry I, and
held that the Eighth Amendment precluded the imposition of the
ultimate penalty on the intellectually disabled. “Because of their
disabilities in areas of reasoning, judgment, and control of their
impulses, however, they do not act with the level of moral
culpability that characterizes the most serious adult criminal
conduct.”147 In Roper v. Simmons, the Court recognized that this
reasoning was directly applicable to juvenile offenders and held
that the imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were
under 18 at the time of the crime violates the Eighth
Amendment: The “differences [between adults and juveniles
under 18 years of age] render suspect any conclusion that a
juvenile falls among the worst offenders. The susceptibility of
juveniles to immature and irresponsible behavior means ‘their
irresponsible conduct is not as morally reprehensible as that of
an adult.’”148 In language directly applicable to the argument
that juvenile offenses should be expunged if they were the result
of compelling mitigating circumstances, the Court stated in
Roper that a “[juvenile’s] own vulnerability and comparative
lack of control over their immediate surroundings mean
juveniles have a greater claim than adults to be forgiven for
failing to escape negative influences in their whole
environment.”149 The Court specifically noted that “‘[f]or most
teens, [risky or antisocial] behaviors are fleeting; they cease with
maturity as individual identity becomes settled.
Only a
relatively small proportion of adolescents who experiment in
risky or illegal activities develop entrenched patterns of problem
behavior that persist into adulthood.”150
In 2010, the Supreme Court decided that juvenile offenders
cannot be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole for a
146. Id.
147. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 306.
148. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005) (citing Thompson v.
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988) (plurality opinion)).
149. Id. at 553. (emphasis added).
150. Id. at 570 (citing Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less
Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished
Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009,
1014 (2003)).
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non-homicide crime.151 The Court further elaborated on the
difference between the culpability of juvenile and adult
offenders:
Roper established that because juveniles have
lessened culpability they are less deserving of the
most severe punishments. As compared to adults,
juveniles have a ‘lack of maturity and an
underdeveloped sense of responsibility’; they ‘are
more vulnerable or susceptible to negative
influences and outside pressures, including peer
pressure’; and their characters are ‘not as well
formed.’152
In 2012, the Court continued this line of cases when it held
that juvenile offenders cannot be subject to mandatory life
imprisonment without parole even for a homicide.153 “Roper and
Graham emphasized that the distinctive attributes of youth
diminish the penological justifications for imposing the harshest
sentences on juvenile offenders, even when they commit terrible
crimes.”154
As one of the leading neurobiologists to study the behavior
of adolescents has explained, the link between child abuse and
delinquent behavior is well-documented.
[E]arly
maltreatment,
even
exclusively
psychological abuse, has enduring negative effects
on brain development. We see specific kinds of
brain abnormalities in psychiatric patients who
were abused as children. We are also beginning
to understand how these abnormalities may
account directly for the personality traits and
other symptoms that patients manifest. . . .
Physical, sexual, and psychological trauma in
childhood may lead to psychiatric difficulties that
show up in childhood, adolescence, or adulthood.
151.
152.
153.
154.

See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
Id. at 68 (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 569-70).
See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
Id. at 2458.
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The victim’s anger, shame and despair can be
directed inward to spawn symptoms such as
depression, anxiety, suicidal ideation, and posttraumatic stress, or directed outward as
aggression,
impulsiveness,
delinquency,
hyperactivity, and substance abuse.155
Other experts have documented the impact of toxic stress
on the developing brain.156 “Early experiences determine
whether a child’s developing brain architecture provides a
strong or weak foundation for all future learning, behavior, and
health.”157 Exposure to what experts describe as “toxic stress”
often associated with abuse and socio-economic deprivation can
have lifelong negative effects on a developing brain.158
Psychologists describe toxic stress as follows:
Toxic stress, is associated with strong and prolonged activation of the body’s stress response
systems in the absence of the buffering protection
of adult support. Stressors include recurrent child
abuse or neglect, severe maternal depression,
parental substance abuse, or family violence.
Under such circumstances, persistent elevations
of stress hormones and altered levels of key brain
chemicals produce an internal physiological state
that disrupts the architecture and chemistry of
the developing brain.159
Studies of at-risk children conclude that “[c]urrent
knowledge about brain and child development, as well as
empirical data from cost-benefit studies, presents a compelling
case for early public investments targeted toward children who

155. Teicher, supra note 17, at 1-2.
156. See HARVARD UNIVERSITY CTR ON DEV. CHILD, A SCIENCE-BASED
FRAMEWORK FOR EARLY CHILDHOOD POL’Y: USING EVIDENCE TO IMPROVE
OUTCOMES LEARNING, BEHAV., & HEALTH FOR VULNERABLE CHILD. (2007).
157. Id. at 2.
158. Id. at 9.
159. Id.
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are at greatest risk for failure in school, in the workplace, and in
society at large.”160
Studies on the impact of abuse and socio-economic
deprivation on the brain development and behavior of at-risk
youth support the argument that it is fundamentally unjust to
hold these young people accountable for behavior that results, in
large part, from factors that are beyond their control. Allowing
youth who present significant mitigation to have juvenile
charges expunged from their records if they complete
appropriate programs and demonstrate improved behavior both
benefits society and incentivizes positive behavior by the youth.
The Supreme Court, in addressing the application of the death
penalty and sentences of life without parole for juveniles, has
recognized that the harshest punishments are not appropriate
for those whose brains are still developing and who have no
choice as to their living circumstances. The same reasoning
applies to the lifelong consequences of a juvenile adjudication of
delinquency. If a fourteen-year old follows her friends and
participates in the burglary of a dwelling, all reasonable people
can agree that serious consequences should follow. Under
current law, if the youth completes probation and any required
programs and does not get into further trouble, the felony will
remain on her record for the rest of her life thus precluding many
opportunities.
The Supreme Court found juvenile life without parole and
the juvenile death penalty violative of the Eighth Amendment
on proportionality grounds. The notion that the life of a teenager
will be forever limited because of a split-second decision made at
fourteen not only violates the Eighth Amendment, it harms
society. Allowing youth who demonstrate compelling mitigating
circumstances to expunge their records would incentivize
positive behavior by at-risk youth and benefit society.

160. Id. at 28.
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